Nash equilibrium in asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables and only one alien

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Abstract

We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player n) does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$’s and $s_i$’s for each player $i$. Mainly we will show the following results. 1) The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $t_i$’s and Player $n$ chooses $s_n$ as their strategic variables. 2) The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $s_i$’s and Player $n$ chooses $t_n$ as their strategic variables. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$’s and the equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$’s are not equivalent although they are equivalent in a symmetric game in which all players have the same payoff functions.

Keywords: partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium, two strategic variables

JEL Classification: C72

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1 Introduction

We consider a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two strategic variables are $t_i$ and $s_i$ for each player $i$. They are related by invertible functions. The game is symmetric for all but one player in the sense that they have the same payoff functions. On the other hand, one player (Player $n$) may have a different payoff function. Thus, the game is partially asymmetric; or there is only one alien. In Section 3 we will show the following main results.

1. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $t_i$’s and Player $n$ chooses $s_n$ as their strategic variables.

2. The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $s_i$’s and Player $n$ chooses $t_n$ as their strategic variables.

An example of multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables is a relative profit maximization game in an oligopoly with differentiated goods. See Section 4. In that section we will show:

1. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $t_i$’s and one player other than Player $n$ chooses $s_i$ as their strategic variables.

2. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $s_i$’s and Player $n$ chooses $t_n$ as their strategic variables.

3. The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $s_i$’s and one player other than Player $n$ chooses $t_i$ as their strategic variables.

4. The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose $t_i$’s and Player $n$ chooses $s_n$ as their strategic variables.

5. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all players $s_i$’s.

In these results $t_i$’s are the outputs and $s_i$’s are the prices. In a symmetric game they are all equivalent\footnote{Hattori, Satoh and Tanaka (2018).}. In Section 4 we also show that with more than one aliens the equivalence result does not hold.

In the next section we present a model of this paper and prove a preliminary result which is a variation of Sion’s minimax theorem.
2 The model and the minimax theorem

We consider a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are \( n \) players, \( n \geq 3 \). Two strategic variables are \( t_i \)'s and \( s_i \)'s, \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). We denote \( N = \{1, \ldots, n\} \). The game is symmetric for Players 1, 2, \ldots, \( n-1 \) in the sense that they have the same payoff functions. On the other hand, Player \( n \) may have a different payoff function.

\( t_i \) is chosen from \( T_i \) and \( s_i \) is chosen from \( S_i \). \( T_i \) and \( S_i \) are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces, respectively, for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). The relations of the strategic variables are represented by

\[
    s_i = f_i(t_1, \ldots, t_n), \quad i \in N,
\]

and

\[
    t_i = g_i(s_1, \ldots, s_n), \quad i \in N.
\]

\( f_i(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) and \( g_i(s_1, \ldots, s_n) \) are continuous, invertible, one-to-one and onto functions. We assume that all \( T_i \)'s are identical, and all \( S_i \)'s are identical. Denote them by \( T \) and \( S \).

When only Player \( n \) chooses \( s_n \), then \( t_n \) is determined according to

\[
    t_n = g_n(f_1(t_1, \ldots, t_n), \ldots, f_{n-1}(t_1, \ldots, t_n), s_n).
\]

We denote this \( t_n \) by \( t_n(t_1, \ldots, t_{n-1}, s_n) \).

When all players choose \( s_i \)'s, \( i \in N \), then \( t_i \)'s for them are determined according to

\[
    \begin{cases}
    t_1 = g_1(s_1, \ldots, s_n), \\
    \ldots \\
    t_n = g_n(s_1, \ldots, s_n).
    \end{cases}
\]

Denote these \( t_i \)'s by \( t_i(s_1, \ldots, s_n) \).

The payoff function of Player \( i \) is \( u_i \), \( i \in N \). It is written as

\[
    u_i(t_1, \ldots, t_n).
\]

We assume

\[
    u_i : T_1 \times \cdots \times T_n \Rightarrow \mathbb{R} \quad \text{for each} \quad i \in N \quad \text{is continuous on} \quad T_1 \times \cdots \times T_n. \quad \text{Thus, it is continuous on} \quad S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n \quad \text{through} \quad f_i, \quad i \in N. \quad \text{It is quasi-concave on} \quad T_i \quad \text{and} \quad S_i \quad \text{for a strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on} \quad T_j, \quad j \neq i \quad \text{and} \quad S_j, \quad j \neq i \quad \text{for each} \quad t_i \quad \text{and} \quad s_j.
\]

We do not postulate differentiability of the payoff functions.

Symmetry of the game for Players 1, 2, \ldots, \( n-1 \) means that these players are interchangeable in the payoff function of each player. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values of the payoff functions of the players is zero.

Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let $X$ and $Y$ be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological spaces, and let $f : X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable, then

$$\max_{x \in X} \min_{y \in Y} f(x, y) = \min_{y \in Y} \max_{x \in X} f(x, y).$$

We follow the description of Sion’s theorem in Kindler (2005). Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper such that Player $n$ may choose $s_n$ and the other players choose $t_i$’s as their strategic variables, we have the following relations.

$$\max_{t_i \in T} \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) = \min_{t_n \in T} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k).$$

$$\max_{t_i \in T} \min_{s_n \in S} u_i(t_i, t_n, s_n, t_k) = \left( \min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, s_n, t_k), t_k \right) = \left( \max_{t_i \in T} \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k), t_k \right),$$

where $t_k$ is a vector of $t_k$, $k \neq i, n$, of the other players other than Players $i$ and $n$ who choose $t_k$’s as their strategic variables. $u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k)$ is the payoff of Player $i$ when Players $i$ and $n$ choose $t_i$ and $t_n$. On the other hand, $u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k)$ means the payoff of Player $i$ when he chooses $t_i$ and Player $n$ chooses $s_n$.

We show the following results.

Lemma 2.

$$\min_{t_n \in T} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) = \min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) = \max_{t_i \in T} \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k),$$

Proof. $\max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k)$ is the maximum of $u_i$ with respect to $t_i$ given $s_n$. Let $\bar{t}_i(s_n) = \arg \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k)$, and fix the value of $t_n$ at $t_n^0 = g_n(f_i(\bar{t}_i(s_n), t_n^0, t_k), f_k, s_n), (1)$

where $f_k$ denotes a vector of the values of $s_k$’s of players who choose $t_k$’s. We have

$$\max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n^0, t_k) \geq u_i(\bar{t}_i(s_n), t_n^0, t_k) = \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k),$$

where $\max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k)$ is the maximum of $u_i$ with respect to $t_i$ given the value of $t_n$ at $t_n^0$. We assume that $\bar{t}_i(s_n) = \arg \max_{t_n \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(s_n, t_k), t_k)$ is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of $u_i$, $\bar{t}_i(s_n)$ is continuous, then any value of $t_n^0$ can be realized by appropriately choosing $s_n$ according to (1). Therefore,

$$\min_{t_n \in T} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) \geq \min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_n \in T} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k).$$

(2)
On the other hand, \( \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) \) is the maximum of \( u_i \) with respect to \( t_i \) given \( t_n \). Let \( \bar{t}_i(t_n) = \arg \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) \), and fix the value of \( t_n \) at \( s_n^0 \).

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) & \geq u_i(\bar{t}_i(s_n), t_n(t_i, s_n^0, t_k), t_k) = \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n^0, t_k), t_k) \) is the maximum of \( u_i \) with respect to \( t_i \) given the value of \( s_n \) at \( s_n^0 \). We assume that \( \bar{t}_i(t_n) = \arg \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) \) is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of \( u_i \), \( \bar{t}_i(t_n) \) is continuous, then any value of \( s_n^0 \) can be realized by appropriately choosing \( t_n \) according to (3). Therefore,

\[
\min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) \geq \min_{t_n \in \mathcal{T}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k). \tag{4}
\]

Combining (2) and (4), we get

\[
\min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) = \min_{t_n \in \mathcal{T}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k).
\]

Since any value of \( s_n \) can be realized by appropriately choosing \( t_n \), we have

\[
\min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) = \min_{t_n \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k).
\]

Thus,

\[
\max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} \min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) = \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k).
\]

Therefore,

\[
\min_{t_n \in \mathcal{T}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k) = \min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k),
\]

\[
= \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} \min_{s_n \in \mathcal{S}} u_i(t_i, t_n(t_i, s_n, t_k), t_k) = \max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} \min_{t_n \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, t_n, t_k). \tag*{\Box}
\]

### 3 The main results

In this section we present the main result of this paper.

**Theorem 1.** *The equilibrium where all players choose \( t_i \)'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when one player (Player \( n \)) chooses \( s_n \) and all other players choose \( t_i \)'s as their strategic variables.*

**Proof.** 1. Consider a situation \( (t_1, \ldots, t_{n-1}, t_n) = (t, \ldots, t, t_n) \). By symmetry for Players 1, 2, \ldots, \( n-1 \),

\[
\max_{t_i \in \mathcal{T}} u_i(t_i, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t_n) = \max_{t_j \in \mathcal{T}} u_j(t, \ldots, t_j, \ldots, t, t_n), \text{ for any } i, j \neq n,
\]

\[5\]
and
\[
\arg \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t_n) = \arg \max_{t_j \in T} u_j(t_i, \ldots, t_j, \ldots, t_n) \in T, \text{ for any } i, j \neq n,
\]
given \( t_n \).

Let
\[
t_n(t) = \arg \max_{t_i \in T} u_n(t_i, \ldots, t, t_n).
\]
We assume that it is a single-valued continuous function.

Consider the following function.
\[
t \to \arg \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t_i, \ldots, t, t_i, \ldots), \text{ for any } i \neq n, \text{ given } t_n.
\]
This function is continuous and \( T \) is compact. Thus, there exists a fixed point given \( t_n \).
Denote it by \( t^*(t_n) \), then
\[
t^*(t_n) = \arg \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*(t_n), \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*(t_n), t_n), \text{ for any } i \neq n, \text{ given } t_n.
\]
Now we consider the following function.
\[
t \to t^*(t_n(t)).
\]
This also has a fixed point. Denote it by \( t^* \) and \( t_n(t^*) \) by \( t^*_n \), then we have
\[
t^* = \arg \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots), \text{ for any } i \neq n,
\]
\[
t^*_n = \arg \max_{t_n \in T} u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n),
\]
\[
\max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t^*_n) = u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t^*_n), \text{ for any } i \neq n,
\]
and
\[
\max_{t_n \in T} u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t^*_n).
\]
\((t_1, \ldots, t_{n-1}, t_n) = (t^*, \ldots, t^*, t^*_n)\) is a Nash equilibrium when all players choose \( t_i \)’s as their strategic variables.

2. Because the game is zero-sum,
\[
u_1(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) + \cdots + u_{n-1}(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) + u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = 0.
\]
By symmetry for Players 1, 2, \ldots, \( n-1 \),
\[
(n - 1)u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) + u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = 0.
\]
This means
\[
(n - 1)u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = -u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n).
\]
and
\[(n - 1) \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = -\max_{t_n \in T} u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n).\]

From this we get
\[\arg \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = \arg \max_{t_n \in T} u_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = t_n^*, \text{ for any } i \neq n.\]

We have
\[\min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n^*) = \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n^*), \text{ for any } i \neq n.\]

Thus,
\[\min_{t_n \in T} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n) \leq \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n^*) = \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) \leq \max_{t_n \in T} \min_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n), \text{ for any } i \neq n.\]

From Lemma 2 we obtain
\[\begin{align*}
\min_{t_n \in T} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n) &= \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n^*) \\
&= \min_{t_n \in T} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n) \\
&= \min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, s_n)) \\
&= \max_{t_i \in T} \min_{s_n \in S} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, s_n)), \text{ for any } i \neq n.
\end{align*}\]

3. Let
\[s_n^0(t^*) = f_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n^*).\]

Since any value of \(s_n\) can be realized by appropriately choosing \(t_n\),
\[\min_{s_n \in S} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, s_n)) = \min_{t_n \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n) = u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n^*).\]

Thus,
\[\arg \min_{s_n \in S} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, s_n)) = s_n^0(t^*).\]

(5) and (6) mean
\[\begin{align*}
\min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, s_n)) &= \min_{s_n \in S} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, s_n)) \\
&= \min_{s_n \in S} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, s_n)).
\end{align*}\]

We have
\[\max_{t_i \in T} u_i(t^*, \ldots, t_i, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t_i, \ldots, t^*, s_n)) \geq u_i(t^*, \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*, \ldots, t^*, s_n)).\]
Thus,
\[
\arg \min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_i \in T} u(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n)) \\
= \arg \min_{s_n \in S} u(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n)) = s_n^0(t^*).
\]
By (7)
\[
\min_{s_n \in S} \max_{t_i \in T} u(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n)) \\
= \max_{t_i \in T} u(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n^0(t^*))) \\
= \min_{s_n \in S} u(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n)) = u(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t^*, s_n^0(t^*))).
\]
Therefore,
\[
\arg \max_{t_i \in T} u(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n^0(t^*))) = t^*.
\] (8)
This holds for any player \( i \neq n \).
On the other hand, because any value of \( s_n \) is realized by appropriately choosing \( t_n \),
\[
\max_{s_n \in S} u(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n)) = \max_{t_i \in T} u_n(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n) = u_n(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n^0).
\]
Therefore,
\[
\arg \max_{s_n \in S} u_n(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n)) = s_n^0(t^*) = f_C(t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n^0).
\] (9)
From (8) and (9), \((t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n(t^*; \ldots, t_i; \ldots, t^*, s_n^0(t^*)))\) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to \((t^*; \ldots, t^*, t_n^0)\).
\[\square\]

Interchanging \( t_i \) and \( s_i \) for each player, we can show

**Theorem 2.** The equilibrium where all players choose \( s_i \)'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when one player (Player \( n \)) chooses \( t_n \) and all other players choose \( s_i \)'s as their strategic variables.

### 4 Various examples

Consider a game of relative profit maximization under oligopoly including four firms with differentiated goods\(^2\). It is a four-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. The firms are A, B, C and D. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of their goods. We consider the following four patterns of competition.

1. Pattern 1: All firms determine their outputs. It is a Cournot case.

The inverse demand functions are

\[ p_A = a - x_A - bx_B - bx_C - bx_D, \]
\[ p_B = a - x_B - bx_A - bx_C - bx_D, \]
\[ p_C = a - x_C - bx_A - bx_B - bx_D, \]

and

\[ p_D = a - x_D - bx_A - bx_B - bx_C, \]

where \(0 < b < 1\). \(p_A, p_B, p_C\) and \(p_D\) are the prices of the goods of Firms A, B, C and D, and \(x_A, x_B, x_C\) and \(x_D\) are their outputs.


From the inverse demand functions,

\[ p_A = (1 - b)a + b^2x_C - bx_C + b^2x_B - bx_B + b^2x_A - x_A + b p_D, \]
\[ p_B = (1 - b)a + b^2x_C - bx_C + b^2x_B - x_B + b^2x_A - x_A + b p_D, \]
\[ p_C = (1 - b)a + b^2x_C - x_C + b^2x_B - bx_B + b^2x_A - x_A + b p_D, \]

\[ x_D = a - bx_C - bx_B - bx_A - p_D \]

are derived.


From the inverse demand functions,

\[ x_A = \frac{(1 - b)a + b^2x_D - bx_D + bp_C + bp_B - bp_A - p_A}{(1 - b)(2b + 1)}, \]
\[ x_B = \frac{(1 - b)a + b^2x_D - bx_D + bp_C - bp_B - p_B + bp_A}{(1 - b)(2b + 1)}, \]
\[ x_C = \frac{(1 - b)a + b^2x_D - bx_D - bp_C - p_C + bp_B + bp_A}{(1 - b)(2b + 1)}, \]
\[ p_D = \frac{(1 - b)a + 3b^2x_D - 2bx_D - x_D + bp_C + bp_B + bp_A}{2b + 1}. \]

4. Pattern 4: All firms determine the prices. It is a Bertrand case.

From the inverse demand functions, the direct demand functions are derived as follows;

\[ x_A = \frac{(1 - b)a + bp_D + bp_C + bp_B - 2bp_A - p_A}{(1 - b)(3b + 1)}, \]
\[ x_B = \frac{(1-b)a + bp_D + bp_C - 2bp_B - p_B + bp_A}{(1-b)(3b+1)}, \]
\[ x_C = \frac{(1-b)a + bp_D - 2bp_C - p_C + bp_B + bp_A}{(1-b)(3b+1)}, \]
\[ x_D = \frac{(1-b)a - 2bp_D - p_D + bp_C + bp_B + bp_A}{(1-b)(3b+1)}. \]

The absolute profits of the firms are
\[ \pi_A = p_A x_A - c_A x_A, \]
\[ \pi_B = p_B x_B - c_B x_B, \]
\[ \pi_C = p_C x_C - c_C x_C, \]
and
\[ \pi_D = p_D x_D - c_D x_D. \]

\(c_A, c_B, c_C\) and \(c_D\) are the constant marginal costs of Firms A, B, C and D. The relative profits of the firms are
\[ \varphi_A = \pi_A - \frac{\pi_B + \pi_C + \pi_D}{3}, \]
\[ \varphi_B = \pi_B - \frac{\pi_A + \pi_C + \pi_D}{3}, \]
\[ \varphi_C = \pi_C - \frac{\pi_A + \pi_B + \pi_D}{3}, \]
and
\[ \varphi_D = \pi_D - \frac{\pi_A + \pi_B + \pi_C}{3}. \]

The firms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the relative profits. We see
\[ \varphi_A + \varphi_B + \varphi_C + \varphi_D = 0, \]
so the game is zero-sum. We assume \(c_A = c_B = c_C\), that is, the game is symmetric for Firms A, B and C. However, \(c_D\) is not equal to \(c_A\). Thus, the game is partially asymmetric. Firm D is an alien.

We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in the above four patterns.

1. Pattern 1
\[ x_A = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3-b)(b+1)}, \]
\[ x_B = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3-b)(b+1)}, \]
\[ x_C = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3-b)(b+1)}, \]
and
\[ x_D = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3-b)(b+1)}. \]
2. Pattern 2

\[ x_A = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}, \]
\[ x_B = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}, \]
\[ x_C = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}, \]

and

\[ x_D = \frac{bc_D - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}. \]

3. Pattern 3

\[ x_A = \frac{3b^2c_D + bc_D + 4b^2c_A - 5bc_A - 3c_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab + 3a}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}, \]
\[ x_B = \frac{3b^2c_D + bc_D + 4b^2c_A - 5bc_A - 3c_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab + 3a}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}, \]
\[ x_C = \frac{3b^2c_D + bc_D + 4b^2c_A - 5bc_A - 3c_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab + 3a}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}, \]
\[ x_D = \frac{3a - 2b^2c_D - 7bc_D - 3c_D + 9b^2c_A + 3bc_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}. \]

4. Pattern 4

\[ x_A = \frac{3b^2c_D + bc_D + 4b^2c_A - 5bc_A - 3c_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab + 3a}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}, \]
\[ x_B = \frac{3b^2c_D + bc_D + 4b^2c_A - 5bc_A - 3c_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab + 3a}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}, \]
\[ x_C = \frac{3b^2c_D + bc_D + 4b^2c_A - 5bc_A - 3c_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab + 3a}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}, \]
\[ x_D = \frac{3a - 2b^2c_D - 7bc_D - 3c_D + 9b^2c_A + 3bc_A - 7ab^2 + 4ab}{2(1 - b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)}. \]

We find that Pattern 1 is equivalent to Pattern 2 (an example of Theorem 1), but it is not equivalent to Patterns 3 and 4, and that Pattern 4 is equivalent to Pattern 3 (an example of Theorem 2), but it is not equivalent to Patterns 1 and 2.

Next let us examine a case where \( c_B = c_A \) and \( c_C = c_D \) but \( c_A \neq c_D \). Consider the following two patterns of competition.

1. Pattern 1: All firms determine their outputs. It is a Cournot case.
We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in these two patterns.

1. Pattern 1

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_A &= \frac{2bc_D - bc_A - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}, \\
    x_B &= \frac{2bc_D - bc_A - 3c_A - ab + 3a}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}, \\
    x_C &= \frac{3a - bc_D - 3c_D + 2bc_A - ab}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}, \\
    x_D &= \frac{3a - bc_D - 3c_D + 2bc_A - ab}{2(3 - b)(b + 1)}.
\end{align*}
\]

2. Pattern 2

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_A &= \frac{2bc_D + bc_A - 3c_A - 3ab + 3a}{6(1 - b)(b + 1)}, \\
    x_B &= \frac{2bc_D + bc_A - 3c_A - 3ab + 3a}{6(1 - b)(b + 1)}, \\
    x_C &= \frac{bc_D - 3c_D + 2bc_A - 3ab + 3a}{6(1 - b)(b + 1)}, \\
    x_D &= \frac{bc_D - 3c_D + 2bc_A - 3ab + 3a}{6(1 - b)(b + 1)}.
\end{align*}
\]

Patterns 1 and 2 are not equivalent. Therefore, with more than one aliens the equivalence result does not hold.
5 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have examined equilibria in a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game. We have shown that in an asymmetric zero-sum game with only one alien (a player who has a different payoff function) we get the equivalence result about the choice of strategic variables.

Acknowledgment

This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Grant Number 15K03481 and 18K01594.

References


